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Many international treaties dealing with the protectionof human rights guarantee freedom of expression,not only on a universal level but also on the regional
level. In fact, both the European and the inter-American
human rights systems regulate this right and recognize its
importance. 
Freedom of expression cannot be unduly restrained, yet
certain limits can be lawfully established. This article will
analyze the right of freedom of expression and its possible
restrictions by adopting a comparative approach that high-
lights the differences and similarities between the European
Court of Human Rights’ recent case law, and the doctrines
set forth by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. These
organs have interpreted the right of freedom of expression
in order to establish rules governing the regulation of free-
dom of expression by states. Some specific matters in which
both courts have been able to define the scope of freedom
of expression and its restrictions studied in this article are the
concept of prior censorship, the role of the press, and the case
law concerning journalists, freedom of expression and pub-
lic debate, and hate speech.
Background: The Regulation of the Right to Freedom of
Expression
The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the first regional
human rights treaty to enter into force, regulates freedom of
expression in Article 10. Paragraph 1 states that it “shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public author-
ity and regardless of frontiers.” Paragraph 2 of Article 10
enounces the legitimate aims that can justify the restriction
of freedom of expression: “The exercise of these freedoms,
since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be sub-
ject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic soci-
ety, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” The European
Court and Commission (until the Commission’s disappear-
ance in 1998 when Protocol 11 entered into force) have con-
sistently interpreted this right as “one of the basic condi-
tions for its progress [of a democratic society] and for the
development of every man,” as expressed in the 1976 judg-
ment Handyside v. UK. 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)
was opened for signature on November 20, 1969. Nearly 20
years passed between the elaboration of the European Con-
vention and the ACHR, enabling the regulation of the right
of freedom of expression, enounced in Article 13 of the
ACHR, to encompass greater protections and be more spe-
cific. This provision states that freedom of expression includes
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
of all kinds. According to Article 13, the exercise of freedom
of expression can be limited only to ensure respect for the
rights and reputation of others as well as to protect national
security, public order, public health, or morals. Further, Arti-
cle 13 requires that these restrictions are expressly estab-
lished by law and that they are implemented only to the
extent necessary to ensure such protection.
Both Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 13 of the ACHR
emphasize that freedom of expression includes a dual concept:
freedom of expression as a social right, which allows for free
debate in society and is considered a basic element in the devel-
opment of democracy; and freedom of expression as an indi-
vidual right, which involves not only the right of everyone to
receive information and ideas, but also the right to hold opin-
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Recognizing that constructive symbolism has long been a catalyst
for sensitivity and awareness, the Thomas Jefferson Center for
the Protection of Freedom of Expression commissioned the
design of a monument dedicated to the principles of free
speech. Incorporating a podium in its design, the monument
serves as a location for individuals to express their views to
groups of fellow citizens. The first monument was placed in Salt
Lake City, Utah. Negotiations are currently taking place with a
number of other localities that have expressed interest in






































ions. This duality implies that a violation of the right to free-
dom of expression affects not only the right of the individual,
but also harms the community as a whole. The texts of the two
provisions have been favored by the extensive case law of the
organs created by both systems, particularly in the European
system. The European system favors this article because it
considers of freedom of expression to be the necessary coun-
terweight to balance the independence of the three branches
of government (legislative, executive, and judiciary). The
scope of this right is quite broad; it includes freedom of opin-
ion as well as the right to give information, to disseminate ideas,
and to receive them. These rights are interpreted very gen-
erally, and any means used to protect them is valid. 
Any type of expression such as verbal, artistic, commercial
expression, publicity, or even silence is included in the scope
of the right as enounced in both Articles 10 of the European
Convention and 13 of the ACHR. According to the case law of
both systems the protection of freedom of expression must be
as broad as possible, and it is the state’s responsibility to take
all the necessary measures to ensure this right. Limits can be
imposed, but only as permitted by the Conventions. 
The right to seek information
has neither been expressly recog-
nized in the text of the European
Convention nor by the European
Court’s case law. This lack of recog-
nition characterizes the main dif-
ference between the European and
inter-American systems. The inter-
American system recognizes the
right to seek information in the
first paragraph of Article 13. This
absence of regulation in the ECHR
is regrettable, because it would be useful for individuals to have
the right to ask governments to disclose information about
issues of general interest, promoting clarity and transparency
in state organs’ actions. 
Prior Censorship
One of the major achievements of the inter-American sys-
tem of protection of human rights, essential to societies with
weak or new democracies, is the prohibition of prior cen-
sorship. Prior censorship is the banning of any type of expres-
sion—oral, written, or otherwise—before it is produced, or
in the case of a publication, to prohibit its distribution. As Pro-
fessor Grossman, dean of the Washington College of Law in
Washington, D.C., has noticed, the possibility for abusing prior
censorship is so great that enduring the exaggeration of free
debate seems better than risking censorship’s protective suf-
focation by public authorities. The principle prohibiting
prior censorship has also been affirmed in the Declaration of
Principles on Freedom of Expression, approved by the Inter-
American Commission during its 108th session in October
2000, as essential and absolute. Further, the sole exception
to the prohibition of prior censorship is explicitly enounced
in Article 13.4 of the ACHR, which states that “public enter-
tainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the
sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral pro-
tection of childhood and adolescence.” 
This exception has been analyzed in an Inter-American
Court case, Olmedo Bustos et al. v. Chile, in which the Chilean
government banned Martin Scorsese’s film The Last Tempta-
tion of Christ in order to protect the morals of minors. Chile
argued that although the government had censored the film
prior to its distribution, it was done in accordance with the
exception included in Article 13.4 of the ACHR, as its pur-
pose was to protect children under 17 years old. The Inter-
American Court declared there had been a violation of Arti-
cle 13 of the ACHR, because children could be easily protected
by adopting less restrictive measures than prior censorship,
such as controlling minors’ entrance to the cinemas.
Strict adherence to the principle of no prior censorship may
become problematic, as the existence of special circumstances
could require restriction of this principle. Examples of such
circumstances include emergency situations, such as threats
to national security or public order, and situations that threaten
other rights. Although the Inter-American Commission and
Court do not normally deal with cases in which two rights or
interests must be balanced, faced with this kind of situation,
they will have to evaluate the possibility of considering valid
limitations to the prior censorship principle. 
The European Convention does not include the principle
of prohibiting prior censorship at all. The European Court,
however, has examined the matter in cases against the United
Kingdom such as the Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 2)
and Observer and Guardian v. UK .
Both of these cases dealt with the
publication by British newspapers
of excerpts from a book containing
the story of a former member of
the British Security Service, relating
to what became known as the “Spy-
catcher” case. Prior to the publi-
cation of the “Spycatcher” stories in
the United States, the British attor-
ney general imposed a permanent
injunction restraining the British
newspapers from any further domestic publication of mate-
rial on the subject. These measures remained in force even
after the publication of the book in the United States in
1987. The European Court stated that, although the ECHR
“does not in terms prohibit the imposition of prior restraints
on publication, . . . the dangers inherent in prior restraints
are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part
of the Court. This is especially so as far as the press is con-
cerned, for news is a perishable commodity and to delay its
publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all
its value and interest.” Before the publication of the book in
the United States, the action of the British courts was con-
sidered necessary for the protection of national security. Fol-
lowing the publication, the Court noted that the confiden-
tiality had been destroyed, and there was, therefore, no
justification for preventing the newspapers from exercising
their freedom of expression. It concluded, thus, that there had
been a breach of Article 10 of the ECHR. The Court has reit-
erated the same principle in Association Ekin v. France.
The Limitations: The “Democratic Society” Clause
If the intent of the courts is to privilege an extension of the
protection of freedom of expression, the limitations that
can be imposed must be restrictively interpreted. Paragraph 2
of Article 10 ECHR contains a list of the interests that can
justify limitation of freedom of expression. These “legitimate
interests” include national security, territorial integrity or
continued on next page
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public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of
health or morals, protection of the reputation of the rights
of others, prevention of the disclosure of information received
in confidence, and maintenance of the authority and impar-
tiality of the judiciary. 
The European Court has produced extensive case law in
which it has tried to balance the essential protection of free-
dom of expression with the equally important necessity of pro-
tecting those interests mentioned above through the concept
of “democratic society” that dominates the entire Convention.
During the 20 years following the Sunday Times cases, the Court
has established the “necessary in a
democratic society test.” The test
takes into account whether the
restriction is an interference of the
public authorities with the exercise
of the right; whether the restriction
is prescribed by law; whether it is
necessary in a “democratic society,”
necessary meaning the existence of
a pressing social need; or whether
the purpose of the restriction is to
protect one of the “legitimate inter-
ests” described above.
Although the text of Article 10
does not include it explicitly, the
European Court has also added a
test to determine the extent to which the principle of pro-
portionality is respected, so that the level of restriction main-
tains an appropriate balance between the freedom of expres-
sion and the necessity of its restriction in a democratic society.
In fact, as stated in The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 2),
the European Court’s task “is not to take the place of the com-
petent national authorities but rather to review under Arti-
cle 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power
of appreciation.” 
Article 13 of the ACHR describes fewer “legitimate aims”
for restricting freedom of expression, narrowing the margin
of possible restrictions the states can impose. These “legitimate
aims” include respect of the rights and the reputation of
others and the protection of national security, public order,
public health, or morals. There is no reference to any kind
of “democratic society” clause in the text of the article. The
Inter-American Court has stated that this difference is not rel-
evant because the ACHR includes Article 29, which establishes
general principles for the interpretation of limitations, among
them the respect for the “just demands” of a “democratic soci-
ety.” The Inter-American Court noted in its advisory opinion
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the
Practice of Journalism, that an equivalent provision does not exist
in the ECHR. In another advisory opinion, The Word “Laws”
in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the
Inter-American Court interpreted Article 30 of the ACHR to
require all the interests enumerated in Article 13 to comport
with the needs of a democratic society.
Freedom of Expression and the Media
The European Court has described journalists as “watch-
dogs” of democracy, as it did in its 2000 judgment Bergens
Tidende and Others v. Norway. In fulfilling its duty to dissemi-
nate information, the press must not overstep certain bounds,
such as harming the reputation and infringing on rights of
others, or disclosing confidential information. In Prager and
Oberschlick v. Austria, the Court dealt with the condemna-
tion of a journalist because of criticism the journalist addressed
to a politician. The Court declared that there had been a vio-
lation of Article 10 and stated that to properly fulfill the
watchdog role and inform the public, a journalist may resort
to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation. Moreover,
in the Oberschlick judgment, the Court held that to call a
politician an “imbecile” does not constitute a gratuitous per-
sonal attack. It added that journalists do not have to prove the
truth of the affirmations published if they are the journalist’s
personal remarks or opinions. On the contrary, regarding the
injunction imposed on a former civil servant of the Bank of
Spain as a result of the criticism he had addressed against the
bank’s president, the European
Court declared that the remarks
were not necessary to any public
debate, and thus concluded that it
was not a violation of Article 10
to sanction the former bank
employee. 
Freedom of expression implies
not only rights but also duties, as
the European Court held in Good-
win v. UK emphasizing that the
media must provide accurate and
reliable information in accordance
with the ethics of journalism and
the principle of good faith. The
European Court has also dealt with
the issue of the media’s duties and responsibilities in situa-
tions of conflict and tension, recognizing in the most recent
Turkish cases that the state is entitled to restrict freedom of
expression when it is sufficiently proven that it is necessary
to protect territorial integrity or national security. This is
especially true in situations related to terrorism. In Karatas
v. Turkey, the applicant, editor-in-chief of a periodic publi-
cation, had been condemned to prison by the Turkish gov-
ernment after the publication of an article containing strong
criticism against the government for its policy toward part of
the Turkish population. The Court in this case highlighted
that freedom of expression could have been restricted if the
publication promoted the use of violent means against the
government or supported acts of terrorism. As the text did
not include such kind of affirmations, the government had
breached Article 10 of the ECHR. On the contrary, in Zana
v. Turkey, the European Court took into account the fact
that the applicant was a political figure who had been con-
demned for a speech addressed to members of a pro-Kurdish
political party during a time when serious disturbances were
taking place in the southeast part of Turkey between the
Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan-promoting politi-
cal party. In such a situation, the European Court considered
that speech that could incite violence could be dangerous in
view of the bloody stage of the conflict and concluded that
there was no violation of Article 10. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also
stressed the importance of balancing different interests in its
advisory opinion Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction,
referring to freedom of expression on one side, and the
right to protect the reputation of others on the other. In its
advisory opinion Compulsory Membership in an Association Pre-
scribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, the Inter-American
Court emphasized the importance of the role of the press in
continued on next page
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the development of a free and democratic society, answering
the Costa Rican government’s question concerning the state’s
adherence to the ACHR’s principles in requiring journalists’
compulsory membership in professional organizations. The
Court stated that a law providing for compulsory association
and, thus, barring non-members from the practice of jour-
nalism was incompatible with the ACHR, as it would deny any
person access to the full use of the news media as a means of
expressing opinions or imparting information. 
The Inter-American Court has not developed such an
extensive and progressive interpretation of the right to free-
dom of expression as the European Court has, and there are
still some fields that remain unprotected. One area still unad-
dressed by the Inter-American
Court but protected by the Euro-
pean Court is the right of journal-
ists who refuse to disclose their
sources of information. 
Public Debate: Opposing Interests at
Stake
The European Court of Human
Rights has addressed the matter of
public debate from different per-
spectives. First, it has carefully made a distinction between the
treatment due to public figures and that which must be
ensured to private individuals. In Lingens v. Austria, a journalist
was prosecuted for slander for publishing strong criticism
against the leader of a political party who had served the Nazi
party during the Second World War. The European Court, tak-
ing its ideas from the U.S. doctrine concerning the importance
of promoting public debate, stated that there had been a
breach of Article 10 of the ECHR, as “the limits of acceptable
criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such
than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the
former, inevitably and knowingly, lays himself open to close
scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the
public at large, and he must, consequently, display a greater
degree of tolerance.” Moreover, the Court has observed that
the limits of permissible criticism against the government are
even greater, because of its dominant position. 
Private individuals, however, are entitled to receive greater
protection against criticism. The Court has further affirmed
that Article 10 is applicable not only to ideas or information
that are favorably received, but also to those that offend,
shock, and disturb. Such are the demands of a “democratic
society.” In Sener v. Turkey, the applicant was convicted of dis-
seminating propaganda concerning the Kurdish minority
through the review of which she was the editor. The Court
concluded that there was a breach of Article 10, because it is
incumbent on the press “to impart information and ideas on
political issues, including divisive ones.” The same kind of rea-
soning was adopted recently in Association Ekin v. France, in
which the applicant complained of the fact that the book his
association had published, Euskadi at War, which gave account
of some aspects of the Basque cause, had been banned in
France. The European Court considered that the content of
the book did not justify such a serious interference of the
applicant’s freedom of expression, and declared that there
had been, therefore, a violation of Article 10.
The Inter-American Commission has also dealt with the
matter of possible criticism of public figures. In Verbitsky v.
Argentina, a journalist was sentenced to one month in prison
for calling the national Supreme Court “asqueroso,” or “dis-
gusting.” The Commission declared the case admissible and
affirmed that public authorities must accept wider criticism
than private individuals. The Commission did not reach a final
report on the merits, however, because a friendly settlement
was agreed upon between the parties. 
The Inter-American Court arrived at a final judgment in
Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, highlighting the different means that
may be used in order to avoid and unlawfully limit freedom
of expression. In this case, a naturalized Peruvian citizen
owned a television company that presented strong criticism
against President Fujimori and the rest of the members of the
Peruvian government. As the law required that only nation-
als could own such a company, the applicant was deprived of
his nationality with the sole intention of restricting his free-
dom of expression so the govern-
ment could avoid the strong criti-
cism. The Inter-American Court
concluded that the Peruvian gov-
ernment was responsible for a vio-
lation of Article 13 of the ACHR.
Both the Court and the Commis-
sion have thus underlined the fact
that public authorities are open
to criticism by citizens and the
right to freedom of expression is to
be encouraged because of its role
in the promotion of free debate. 
Hate Speech: Lessons from the United States?
The European Convention has consistently been inter-
preted as holding that hate speech is contrary to the princi-
ples that a democratic society espouses. The vast majority of
complaints filed by individuals prosecuted because of racist
or “revisionist” statements were therefore declared inadmis-
sible by the European Commission. It should be taken into
account that the European Convention was part of the moral
answer to the Nazi ideology after the Second World War
and that the patterns followed by the European Court in its
case law have been a tribute to this cause. Despite this fact,
the Court has always emphasized the importance of pro-
tecting freedom of expression even when faced with hate or
rage speech. In Jersild v. Denmark, the Court clearly established
that “the punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dis-
semination of statements made by another person in an
interview would seriously hamper . . . the press.” The appli-
cant was a journalist who reported on a xenophobic group,
reproducing the declarations of its leaders against immi-
grants. As the broadcast could not objectively have been
intended to spread these kinds of ideas or opinions, the
Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10
of the European Convention. In answering the criticism of this
judgment, the European Court in Thomas v. Luxembourg
further affirmed that making a general requirement for jour-
nalists systematically and formally to distance themselves
from insulting or provocative citations is not consistent with
press’s role of disseminating ideas and opinions. 
The decision in the Jersild case seems to have been influ-
enced by United States case law. Freedom of expression is reg-
ulated in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
which reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to peti-
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tion the Government for a redress of grievances.” The United
States Supreme Court’s decisions are a product of their time
and context; the First Amendment has been restricted to
protect racial minorities but expanded to ensure the pro-
tection of the free market of ideas. Restricting hate speech
may improve the quality of public debate, mainly in the con-
text of most of the European states, and the U.S. model may
not be adaptable to young or weak democracies.
The Inter-American Commission and Court have not yet
dealt with hate speech issues, but the European Court’s inter-
pretation of Article 10 of the ECHR and the United Nations
Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
are immediate precedents for the American Convention,
seem to imply that Article 13 is incompatible with speech incit-
ing racial or religious hatred. 
Conclusion 
Freedom of expression is a right considered essential in
the promotion and respect of a democratic society, and
therefore must be interpreted in the least restrictive possible
way. This right has been privileged by both the European and
the inter-American systems, although a balance between this
right and other interests is sought through case law, recog-
nizing that there is a certain interdependence among the
different rights recognized in the Conventions.
The text of the European Convention is not as detailed in
describing the limitations as the American Convention, and
the European states have traditionally been granted a margin
of appreciation due to the political homogeneity that exists in
Europe and the confidence in the states’ abilities to redress
major violations. Nevertheless, the European Court has settled
vast case law narrowing the limits and defining the restrictions,
which the new democracies now incorporated into the system
will have to apply and respect. The Inter-American Commis-
sion and Court, more reluctant to leave to the states the
choice of abusing the limitations, have stressed the necessity
of respecting freedom of expression in the Americas, and in
1997, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression was created. 
True freedom of speech can be realized only if states fully
comply with the existing regional norms. Although this ideal
is still far from being achieved, awareness and promotion of
free and open debate is the first step to its realization. 
*Amaya Úbeda de Torres is a Ph.D. candidate at the Universi-
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describing the growing consensus against executing men-
tally retarded offenders, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
dropped a footnote in which he referred in passing to the fact
that “within the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.” This led Chief
Justice William Rehnquist to write a separate dissenting opin-
ion—Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the main dissent—to chide
the Court for its decision to “place weight on foreign laws,”
saying, “I fail to see, how the views of other countries regard-
ing the punishment of their citizens provide any support for
the Court’s ultimate determination.”
This October, Justice Breyer tried again. In Foster v. Florida,
petitioner Charles Foster had spent more than 27 years in
prison since his initial death sentence in 1975. Justice Breyer
urged the Court to take the case, again citing “courts of
other nations [that] had found that delays of 15 years or less
can render capital punishment degrading, shocking or cruel,”
and noting that The Federalist Number 63 also urged “atten-
tion to the judgment of other nations” when determining “the
justice and propriety of [America’s] measures.” This was just
too much for Justice Thomas, who again wrote a separate con-
currence to the denial of certiorari, bursting out in a footnote
that “while Congress as a legislature may wish to consider the
actions of any other nation on any issue it likes, this Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign
moods, fads or factions on Americans.”
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
were the only two who spoke out against the importation of
foreign norms even for consideration, I think they reflect a
very wide-spread attitude among American judges, as wit-
nessed by the absence of any substantial judicial use, for any
purpose, of foreign norms. Note also that Justice Breyer’s
efforts drew only marginal support from Justice Stevens in his
Atkins opinion. For this reason, I think any effort to import
international norms into American constitutional law, espe-
cially as governing norms, is largely a waste of time, at least
for some time. 
Constitutional law is indeed moving toward some degree
of internationalization . . . but not here. 
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